10.4.1. "Why won't government simply _ban such encryption methods?"
+ This has always been the Number One Issue!
- raised by Stiegler, Drexler, Salin, and several others
(and in fact raised by some as an objection to my even
discussing these issues, namely, that action may then be
taken to head off the world I describe)
+ Types of Bans on Encryption and Secrecy
- Ban on Private Use of Encryption
- Ban on Store-and-Forward Nodes
- Ban on Tokens and ZKIPS Authentication
- Requirement for public disclosure of all transactions
+ Recent news (3-6-92, same day as Michaelangelo and
Lawnmower Man) that government is proposing a surcharge
on telcos and long distance services to pay for new
equipment needed to tap phones!
- S.266 and related bills
- this was argued in terms of stopping drug dealers and
other criminals
- but how does the government intend to deal with the
various forms fo end-user encryption or "confusion"
(the confusion that will come from compression,
packetizing, simple file encryption, etc.)
+ Types of Arguments Against Such Bans
- The "Constitutional Rights" Arguments
+ The "It's Too Late" Arguments
- PCs are already widely scattered, running dozens of
compression and encryption programs...it is far too
late to insist on "in the clear" broadcasts, whatever
those may be (is program code distinguishable from
encrypted messages? No.)
- encrypted faxes, modem scramblers (albeit with some
restrictions)
- wireless LANs, packets, radio, IR, compressed text and
images, etc....all will defeat any efforts short of
police state intervention (which may still happen)
+ The "Feud Within the NSA" Arguments
- COMSEC vs. PROD
+ Will affect the privacy rights of corporations
- and there is much evidence that corporations are in
fact being spied upon, by foreign governments, by the
NSA, etc.
+ They Will Try to Ban Such Encryption Techniques
+ Stings (perhaps using viruses and logic bombs)
- or "barium," to trace the code
+ Legal liability for companies that allow employees to use
such methods
- perhaps even in their own time, via the assumption that
employees who use illegal software methods in their own
time are perhaps couriers or agents for their
corporations (a tenuous point)
10.4.2. The long-range impossibility of banning crypto
- stego
- direct broadcast to overhead satellites
- samizdat
- compression, algorithms, ....all made plaintext hard to
find
10.4.3. Banning crypto is comparable to
+ banning ski masks because criminals can hide their identity
- Note: yes, there are laws about "going masked for the
purpose of being masked," or somesuch
+ insisting that all speech be in languages understandable by
eavesdroppers
- (I don't mean "official languages" for dealing with the
Feds, or what employers may reasonably insist on)
- outlawing curtains, or at least requiring that "Clipper
curtains" be bought (curtains which are transparent at
wavelengths the governments of the world can use)
- position escrow, via electronic bracelets like criminals
wear
- restrictions on books that possibly help criminals
- banning body armor (proposed in several communities)
- banning radar detectors
- (Note that these bans become more "reasonable" when the
items like body armor and radar detectos are reached, at
least to many people. Not to me, of course.)
10.4.4. So Won't Governments Stop These Systems?
- Citing national security, protection of private property,
common decency, etc.
+ Legal Measures
- Bans on ownership and operation of "anonymous" systems
+ Restrictions on cryptographic algorithms
- RSA patent may be a start
+ RICO, civil suits, money-laundering laws
- FINCEN, Financial Crimes Information Center
- IRS, Justice, NSA, FBI, DIA, CIA
- attempts to force other countries to comply with U.S.
banking laws
10.4.5. Scenario for a ban on encryption
- "Paranoia is cryptography's occupational hazard." [Eric
Hughes, 1994-05-14]
+ There are many scenarios. Here is a graphic one from Sandy
Sandfort:
- "Remember the instructions for cooking a live frog. The
government does not intend to stop until they have
effectively eliminated your privacy.
STEP 1: Clipper becomes the de facto encryption
standard.
STEP 2: When Cypherpunks and other "criminals" eschew
Clipper in favor of trusted strong crypto, the government
is "forced" to ban non-escrowed encryption systems.
(Gotta catch those pedophiles, drug dealers and
terrorists, after all.)
STEP 3: When Cypherpunks and other criminals use
superencryption with Clipper or spoof LEAFs, the
government will regretably be forced to engage in random
message monitoring to detect these illegal techniques.
Each of these steps will be taken because we wouldn't
passively accept such things as unrestricted wiretaps and
reasonable precautions like
digital telephony. It will portrayed as our fault.
Count on it." [Sandy Sandfort, 6-14-94]
10.4.6. Can the flow of bits be stopped? Is the genie really out of
the bottle?
- Note that Carl Ellison has long argued that the genie was
never _in_ the bottle, at least not in the U.S. in non-
wartime situations (use of cryptography, especially in
communications, in wartime obviously raises eyebrows)
By Tim May, see README
HTML by Jonathan Rochkind