16.19.1. "my house, my rules"
16.19.2. a la David Friedman
16.19.3. markets for laws, Law Merchant
- corporations, other organizations have their own local
legal rules
- Extropians had much debate on this, and various competing
legal codes (as an experiment...not very sucessful, for
various reasons)
- "Snow Crash"
16.19.4. the Cypherpunks group is itself a good example:
- a few local rules (local to the group)
- a few constraints by the host machine environment (toad,
soda)
+ but is the list run on "United States law"?
- with members in dozens of countries?
- only when the external laws are involved (if one of us
threatened another, and even then this is iffy) could the
external laws....
- benign neglect, by necessity
16.19.5. I have absolutely no faith in the law when it comes to
cyberspatial matters (other matters, too).
- especially vis-a-vis things like remote access to files, a
la the AA BBS case
- "the law is an ass"
- patch one area, another breaks
- What then? Technology. Remailers, encryption
16.19.6. Contracts and Cryptography
+ "How can contracts be enforced in crypto anarchy
situations?"
- A key question, and one which causes many people to
question whether crypto anarchy can work at all.
+ First, think of how many situations are _already_
essentially outside the scope of the law...and yet in
which something akin to "contracts" are enforceable,
albeit not via the legal process.
- friends, relationships
+ personal preferences in food, books, movies, etc.
- what "recourse" does one have in cases where a meal
is unsatisfactory? Not going back to the restaurant
is usually the best recourse (this is also a hint
about the importance of "future expectation of
business" as a means of dealing with such things).
- In these cases, the law is not directly involved. In
fact, the law is not involved in _most_ human (and
nonhuman!) interactions.
+ The Main Approaches:
+ Reputations.
- reputations are important, are not lightly to be
regarded
- Repeat Business.
- Escrow Services.
+ The "right of contract" (and the duty to adhere to them, to
not try to change the contract after the facts) is a
crucial building block.
- Imagine a society in which contracts are valid. This
allows those willing to sign contracts setting limits on
malpractice to get cheaper health care, while those who
won't sign such contracts are free to sue--but will of
course have to pay more for health care. Nothing is free,
and frivolous malpractice lawsuits have increased
operating costs. (Recall the "psychic" who alleged that
her psychic powers were lost after a CAT scan. A jury
awarded her millions of dollars. Cf. Peter Huber's books
on liability laws.)
- Now imagine a society in which it is never clear if a
contract is valid, or whether courts will overturn or
amend a contract. This distorts the above analysis, and
so hospitals, for example, have to build in safety
margins and cushions.
+ Crypto can help by creating escrow or bonding accounts held
by third parties--untraceable to the other parties--which
act as bonding agents for completion of contracts.
- Such arrangements may not be allowed. For example, a
hospital which attempted to deal with such a bonding
agency, and which asked customers to also deal with them,
could face sanctions.
- "Secured credit cards" are a current example: a person pays
a reserve amount greater than the card limits (maybe 110%).
The reason for doing this is not to obtain "credit,"
obviously, but to be able to order items over the phone, or
to avoid carrying cash. (The benefit is thus in the
_channel_ of commerce).
16.19.7. Ostracism, Banishment in Privately Produced Law
+ Voluntary and discretionary electronic communities also
admit the easy possibility of banishment or ostracism
(group-selected kill files). Of course, enforcement is
generally difficult, e.g., there is nothing to stop
individuals from continuing to communicate with the
ostracized individual using secure methods.
- I can imagine schemes in which software key escrow is
used, but these seem overly complicated and intrusive.
- The ability of individuals, and even subgroups, to thwart
the ostracism is not at all a bad thing.
-
- "In an on-line world it would be much easier to enforce
banishment or selective ostracism than in real life.
Filtering agents could look for certificates from accepted
enforcement agencies before letting messages through. Each
user could have a set of agencies which were compatible
with his principles, and another set of "outlaws". You
could even end up with the effect of multiple "logical
subnets" of people who communicate with each other but not
outside their subnet. Some nets might respect intellectual
property, others not, and so on." [Hal Finney, 1994-08-21]
16.19.8. Governments, Cyberspaces, PPLs
- Debate periodically flares up on the List about this topic.
- Can't be convered here in sufficient detail.
- Friedman, Benson, Stephenson's "Snow Crash," etc.
16.19.9. No recourse in the courts with crypto-mediated systems
- insulated from the courts
- PPLs are essential
- reputations, escrow, mediation (crypto-mediated mediation?)
16.19.10. Fraud
- not exactly rare in the non-crypto world!
- new flavors of cons will likely arise
- anonymous escrow accounts, debate with Hal Finney on this
issue, etc.
16.19.11. PPLs, polycentric law
By Tim May, see README
HTML by Jonathan Rochkind