9.18.1. Constitutional Issues
- 4th Amend
- privacy of attorney-client, etc.
+ Feds can get access without public hearings, records
- secret intelligence courts
-
+ "It is uncontested (so far as I have read) that under
certain circum-
- stances, the Federal intelligence community wil be
permitted to
- obtain Clipper keys without any court order on public
record. Only
- internal, classified proceedings will protect our
privacy." <Steve Waldman, steve@vesheu.sar.usf.edu,
sci.crypt, 4-13-94>
9.18.2. "What are some dangers of Clipper, if it is widely adopted?"
+ sender/receiver ID are accessible without going to the key
escrow
- this makes traffic analysis, contact lists, easy to
generate
+ distortions of markets ("chilling effects") as a plan by
government
- make alternatives expensive, hard to export, grounds for
suspicion
- use of ITAR to thwart alternatives (would be helped if
Cantwell bill to liberalize export controls on
cryptography (HR 3627) passes)
+ VHDL implementations possible
- speculates Lew Glendenning, sci.crypt, 4-13-94
- and recall MIPS connection (be careful here)
9.18.3. Market Isssues
9.18.4. "What are the weaknesses in Clipper?"
+ Carl Ellison analyzed it this way:
- "It amuses the gallows-humor bone in me to see people
busily debating the quality of Skipjack as an algorithm
and the quality of the review of its strength.
Someone proposes to dangle you over the Grand Canyon
using
sewing thread
tied to
steel chain
tied to
knitting yarn
and you're debating whether the steel chain has been X-
rayed properly to see if there are flaws in the metal.
"Key generation, chip fabrication, court orders,
distribution of keys once acquired from escrow agencies
and safety of keys within escrow agencies are some of the
real weaknesses. Once those are as strong as my use of
1024-bit RSA and truly random session keys in keeping
keys on the two sides of a conversation with no one in
the middle able to get the key, then we need to look at
the steel chain in the middle: Skipjack itself." [Carl
Ellison, 1993-08-02]
+ Date: Mon, 2 Aug 93 17:29:54 EDT
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: cross-post
Status: OR
Path: transfer.stratus.com!ellisun.sw.stratus.com!cme
From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Skipjack review as a side-track
Date: 2 Aug 1993 21:25:11 GMT
Organization: Stratus Computer, Marlboro MA
Lines: 28
Message-ID: <23k0nn$8gk@transfer.stratus.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: ellisun.sw.stratus.com
It amuses the gallows-humor bone in me to see people
busily debating the
quality of Skipjack as an algorithm and the quality of
the review of its
strength.
Someone proposes to dangle you over the Grand Canyon
using
sewing thread
tied to
steel chain
tied to
knitting yarn
and you're debating whether the steel chain has been X-
rayed properly
to see if there are flaws in the metal.
Key generation, chip fabrication, court orders,
distribution of keys once
acquired from escrow agencies and safety of keys within
escrow agencies are
some of the real weaknesses. Once those are as strong as
my use of
1024-bit RSA and truly random session keys in keeping
keys on the two sides
of a conversation with no one in the middle able to get
the key, then we
need to look at the steel chain in the middle: Skipjack
itself.
- "Key generation, chip fabrication, court orders,
distribution of keys once acquired from escrow agencies
and safety of keys within escrow agencies are some of
the real weaknesses. Once those are as strong as my
use of 1024-bit RSA and truly random session keys in
keeping keys on the two sides of a conversation with no
one in the middle able to get the key, then we need to
look at the steel chain in the middle: Skipjack
itself."
9.18.5. What it Means for the Future
9.18.6. Skipjack
9.18.7. National security exceptions
- grep Gilmore's FOIA for mention that national security
people will have direct access and that this will not be
mentioned to the public
+ "The "National Security" exception built into the Clipper
proposal
- leaves an extraordinarily weak link in the chain of
procedures designed
- to protect user privacy. To place awesome powers of
surveillance
- technologically within the reach of a few, hoping that so
weak a chain
- will bind them, would amount to dangerous folly. It
flies in the face
- of history. <Steve Waldman, steve@vesheu.sar.usf.edu, 4-
14-94, talk.politics.crypto>
9.18.8. In my view, any focus on the details of Clipper instead of
the overall concept of key escrow plays into their hands.
This is not to say that the work of Blaze and others is
misguided....in fact, it's very fine work. But a general
focus on the _details_ of Skipjack does nothing to allay my
concerns about the _principle_ of government-mandated crypto.
If it were "house key escrow" and there were missing details
about the number of teeth allowed on the keys, would be then
all breathe a sigh of relief if the details of the teeth were
clarified? Of course not. Me, I will never use a key escrow
system, even if a blue ribbon panel of hackers and
Cypherpunks studies the design and declares it to be
cryptographically sound.
9.18.9. Concern about Clipper
- allows past communications to be read
+ authorities could--maybe--read a lot of stuff, even
illegally, then use this for other investigations (the old
"we had an anonymous tip" ploy)
- "The problem with Clipper is that it provides police
agencies with dramatically enhanced target acquistion.
There is nothing to prevent NSA, ATF, FBI (or the Special
Projects division of the Justice Department) from
reviewing all internet traffic, as long as they are
willing to forsake using it in a criminal prosecution."
[dgard@netcom.com, alt.privacy.clipper, 1994-07-05]
9.18.10. Some wags have suggested that the new escrow agencies be
chosen from groups like Amnesty International and the ACLU.
Most of us are opposed to the "very idea" of key escrow
(think of being told to escrow family photos, diaries, or
house keys) and hence even these kinds of skeptical groups
are unacceptable as escrow agents.
By Tim May, see README
HTML by Jonathan Rochkind